cue 


- 


J-yrwers 


F.  P.  A. 
Pamphlet  No.  46 
Series  of  1926-27 


INTERNATIONAL 
DRUG  CONTROL 

Existing  Methods  and  Proposed  Solutions 


by 

C.  K.  CRANE 


JULY,  1927 


Published  by  the 

Opium  Research  Committee 

of  the 

FOREIGN  Policy  association 

NATIONAL  HEADQUARTERS 


Eighteen  East  Forty-First  Street 
New  York  City 


International  Drug  Control 


Existing  Methods  and  Proposed  Solutions 
By  C.  K.  Crane 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

I.  The  Theoretically  Best  Solution  - - - 4 

II.  Why  This  Solution  Is  Not  Possible  of 

Achievement  for  Many  Years  - - - 5 

III.  The  Compromise  Plan  Now  in  Operation  - 8 

IV.  Weaknesses  Of  This  Plan  - - - - 10 

V.  A Proposed  Solution  - - - - - 11 

VI.  Drawbacks  to  This  Solution  - - - - 14 

VII.  Conclusion  - 17 

Note  - 18 


International  Drug  Control 

Existing  Methods  and  Proposed  Solutions 
By  C.  K.  Crane 


Perhaps  the  most  illuminating  and  useful  con- 
tribution in  recent  years  to  the  literature  for  the 
layman  on  the  subject  of  the  international  narcotic 
problem  is  John  Palmer  Gavit’s  “Opium. In  the  “Fore- 
word” to  his  book,  Mr.  Gavit  says: 

“The  world  is  slowly  coming  to  recognize  the  existence  of 
a world  problem  and  a world  task  of  the  first  magnitude, 
momentously  important  and  exceedingly  difficult,  demanding 
complete  international  unity  of  intelligence  and  administrative 
co-operation. 

“The  complex  nature  and  the  obstinacy  of  the  problem  were 
vividly  disclosed  in  the  great  International  Opium  Conferences 
held  under  the  auspices  of  the  League  of  Nations  at  Geneva 
from  November  3,  1924,  to  February  19,  1925.  To  anyone 
who,  whether  as  participant  or  as  attentive  spectator,  sat  for  all 
those  weeks  in  the  midst  of  those  gatherings  of  the  nations, 
observing  the  interplay  and  conflict  of  diverse  interests  and 
opinions,  it  is  no  source  of  surprise  that  the  people  of  all  the 
nations  represented  or  unrepresented  therein,  were  bewildered 
by  the  conflicting  and  frequently  unintelligible  reports  which 
emanated  from  them.  The  writers  of  those  reports  were  not 
only  more  or  less  subject  to  the  national  bias  and  prejudices 
of  their  respective  allegiances  and  a certain  abiding  jealousy  of 
supposedly  conflicting  political  and  commercial  interests ; they 
were  also  more  or  less  confused  and  bemuddled  by  lack  of 
familiarity  with  an  exceedingly  intricate  and  baffling  subject. 
In  that  respect  they  were  no  worse  off  than  all  except  a very 
few  of  the  delegates  to  the  conferences !” 

The  purpose  of  this  pamphlet  is  not  to  make  a most 
intricate  problem  appear  to  be  simple,  but  rather  to  give 

1.  Published  by  George  Routledge  and  Sons,  London,  1925.  Mr.  Gavit 
was  formerly  Managing  Editor  of  the  Nenv  York  Evening  Post,  Chief  of  the 
Washington  Bureau  of  the  Associated  Press,  etc. 

3 


to  the  layman  the  high  lights  of  the  opium  problem, 
shorn  as  much  as  possible  of  its  political,  diplomatic  and 
economic  complexities.^ 

I.  The  Theoretically  Best  Solution 

The  ideal  solution  of  the  problem  was  first  crystal- 
lized in  international  thought  in  the  principle  enunci- 
ated by  the  United  States  delegation  to  the  May,  1923, 
session  of  the  Advisory  Committee  on  Opium  of  the 
League  of  Nations^  which,  in  effect,  was  as  follows: 

The  production  of  raw  opium  must  be  controlled  in  such  a 
manner  that  there  will  be  no  surplus  available  for  manufacture 
into  drugs  over  and  above  the  world’s  medical  and  scientific 
requirements. 

Obviously,  if  this  principle  could  be  applied  effec- 
tively it  would  be  accepted  by  common  consent  as  the 
best  solution.  Then  narcotic  addiction,  whether  by  eat- 
ing or  smoking  opium  as  in  Eastern  countries^  or  by  the 


2.  Although  the  opium  poppy  and  opium,  together  with  morphine,  heroin 
and  other  drugs  derived  from  opium,  are  here  particularly  dealt  with,  the 
problem  of  the  coca  leaf,  from  which  comes  cocaine,  is  almost  parallel;  it  re- 
ceived equal  consideration  at  the  Geneva  Conferences  and  is  of  secondary  im- 
portance only  because  relatively  there  is  but  little  cocaine  addiction. 

3.  When  the  League  of  Nations  was  formed,  and  owing  to  a provision 
in  its  Covenant,  the  Netherlands  Government  ceased  to  be  the  medium  of 
communication  for  those  signatories  to  the  Hague  Convention  that  were  also 
members  of  the  League.  In  respect  to  such  countries,  this  function  was  taken 
over  by  the  League.  Countries  like  the  United  States,  who  are  signatories  to 
the  Hague  Convention  but  not  members  of  the  League,  send  and  receive  reports 
and  information  (and  other  communications,  as  a rule,  although  direct  com- 
munication between  the  signatories  is  permitted)  through  the  Netherlands  Gov- 
ernment which,  for  such  countries,  acts  as  a medium  of  communication  be- 
tween them  and  the  League.  The  United  States  also  cooperates  “in  a con- 
sultative capacity”  with  the  “Advisory  Committee  on  Traffic  in  Opium  and 
Other  Dangerous  Drugs”  (Advisory  Committee  on  Opium)  created  by  the 
League,  and  our  delegates  to  the  Second  Geneva  Opium  Conference  of  1924-25 
even  had  full  powers  to  sign  the  Convention  to  that  Conference  had  they  seen  fit. 
We  were  not  represented  at  the  First  Conference,  which  concerned  itself  with 
the  suppression  of  opium  smoking — the  representatives  being  only  of  those 
countries  where  or  in  whose  colonies  this  custom  prevailed. 

4.  However,  morphine  and  heroin  have  become  increasingly  used  in 
China  in  recent  years,  the  devotees  of  these  products  of  Western  civilization 
being  numbered  in  scores  of  thousands — according  to  the  Pekin  International 
Anti-Opium  Association. 


4 


use  of  manufactured  drugs,  as  in  our  Western  civiliza- 
tion, must  cease.  There  can  be  no  addicts  if  there  are  no 
narcotic  drugs  available  to  create  them.  Then,  too,  a 
minimum  of  laws  would  be  required,  institutions  would 
be  done  away  with  and  public  expenditure  reduced  to  a 
negligible  amount.  Furthermore,  since  criminal  experts 
estimate  that  at  least  fifty  per  cent  of  our  addicts  resort 
to  crime  as  a means  of  obtaining  money  to  purchase  their 
supplies,  the  indirect  annual  saving  in  this  country  alone 
could  certainly  be  estimated  in  the  millions  of  dollars. 

II.  Why  this  Solution  is  not  Possible  of 
Achievement  for  Many  Years 

In  a matter  of  this  nature  an  agreement  that  would 
be  binding  on  all  countries  save  one  would  be  little  better 
than  no  agreement  at  all.  Neither  individuals  nor  coun- 
tries will  deny  themselves  for  a principle  or  cause  if  an- 
other, unrestrained  by  similar  considerations,  is  to  profit 
by  a world  monopoly.  Thus  it  is  that  this  ideal  solution 
is  not  possible  of  achievement  because  it  is,  and  doubtless 
for  some  years  will  continue  to  be,  quite  impossible  for 
China  in  her  existing  chaotic  and  ungovernable  state  to 
bind  herself  to  enforce  the  measures  necessary  to  control 
her  poppy  production.  For  this  reason  if  for  no  other, 
the  plan  to  “pull  up  the  poppies”  cannot  be  considered 
today  any  more  than  at  the  Geneva  Opium  Conferences 
of  1924-25. 

Persia  is  one  of  the  largest  producers  of  opium  in  the 
world.  While  the  opium  revenue  of  Persia  is  only  8.9 
per  cent  of  her  total  revenue,  this  figure  does  not  give  a 
true  representation  of  the  importance  of  the  industry  to 
her.  For  example,  her  opium  exports  constitute  from  20 
per  cent  to  25  per  cent  of  her  total  exports,  exclusive  of 
oil.  In  one  city  of  80,000  population  it  is  estimated  that 
“at  least  25  per  cent  of  the  population  is  dependent  to  a 
considerable  extent  on  the  opium  trade.  In  many  prov- 
inces opium  is  practically  the  only  crop  which  yields 

5 


cash  returns  in  any  way  commensurate  with  the  labor  of 
cultivation.”^  Gavit  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  state- 
ment might  apply  to  Persia  that  if  you  take  away  the  cul- 
ture of  the  poppy,  you  take  away  the  people’s  means  of 
living. 

The  Persian  Government  has  recently  announced  its 
intention  of  recommending  to  Parliament  a plan  whereby 
Persia  would  undertake,  following  three  years  of  prepar- 
ation, to  reduce  her  poppy  acreage  “at  the  rate  of  10  per 
cent  of  the  quantity  remaining  at  the  end  of  each  year,” 
with  a reservation  that  after  the  plan  has  been  in  effect 
for  three  years  the  position  will  be  reconsidered,  taking 
into  account,  among  other  factors,  what  action  towards 
curtailment  has  meanwhile  been  taken  by  not  only  the 
other  producing  countries  but  also  by  the  manufacturing 
countries.  Even  should  the  plan  become  operative,  and 
for  an  indefinite  period,  Persia  s poppy  acreage  would 
still,  after  ten  years,  be  only  reduced  by  52  per  centf 

Turkey,  the  largest  producer  of  opium  most  suitable 
for  manufacture  into  drugs,  is  neither  a signatory  to  the 
Hague  Convention^  nor  a member  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions, therefore  her  cooperation  in  any  plan  to  “pull  up 
the  poppies”  could  at  best  only  be  expected  to  be  luke- 
warm, especially  in  view  of  the  great  commercial  bene- 
fits this  industry  has  and  would  continue  to  have  for  her. 

A further  obstacle  that  stands  in  the  way  of  achieving 
the  ideal  solution  is  the  fundamentally  sound  principle 
of  non-interference  with  any  country’s  rights  as  regards 
its  own  consumption  of  narcotics.  The  American  Dele- 


5.  Persian  Memorandum,  Records,  Second  Conference,  Vol.  II,  page 

194,  ff. 

6.  Persia’s  contemplated  action  is  the  result  of  the  recommendations  of 
the  Commission  appointed  by  the  League  to  study  the  possibility  of  crop  substi- 
tution in  Persia.  This  question  will  be  discussed  at  the  League  Assembly  this 
September.  See  Minutes,  6th  Meeting,  44th  Session,  League  of  Nations  Council. 

7.  By  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne,  which  she  ratified  in  August,  1924,  Turkey 
undertook  to  adhere  to  the  Hague  Convention.  Nevertheless,  up  to  January, 
1927,  she  had  not  done  so. 


6 


gation  to  the  Second  Geneva  Conference  “repeatedly 
said  (in  connection  with  India)  that  it  did  not  propose 
that  any  country  should  be  prevented  from  consuming 
opium  or  coca  leaves  within  its  own  borders  in  any  way 
that  it  might  see  fit.”*  In  matters  of  principle  our  Dele- 
gation was  perhaps  the  most  unyielding  of  any  at  Geneva 
and  with  added  assurance,  therefore,  it  may  be  assumed 
that  the  producing  countries  would  see  to  it  that  their 
rights  in  this  respect  were  not  interfered  with.  If  these 
rights  were  generally  acknowledged  it  might  be  difficult 
to  determine  in  the  case  of  some  countries  whether  the 
entire  amount  produced  was  actually  used  for  domestic 
purposes  and  legitimate  export  and  did  not  find  its  way 
eventually  into  illicit  channels. 

Furthermore,  there  is  always  the  question  whether 
any  further  effort  in  the  direction  of  the  ideal  solution 
of  uprooting  the  poppy  would  be  worth  while,  inasmuch 
as  substitutes  for  morphine  and  heroin  will  in  all  prob- 
ability be  manufactured  synthetically  in  the  not  distant 
future.  Should  these  synthetic  drugs  be  low  in  price,  the 
growth  of  the  poppy  for  legitimate  drug  manufacture 
would  automatically  cease.  Approximate  substitutes  for 
cocaine  are  already  on  the  market,  some  of  them  widely 
used,  and  it  is  reasonable  to  predict  that  modern  chem- 
istry will  soon  perfect  identical  substitutes  for  the  drugs 
derived  from  opium.  There  would,  to  be  sure,  be  quite 
a different  effect  on  the  situation  resulting  from  the  intro- 
duction of  habit-forming  substitutes  than  would  be  the 
case  should  they  be  harmless — but  that  is  another  story. 

If  we  suppose  for  the  moment  that  all  the  obstacles 
enumerated  above  did  not  exist,  there  would  still  remain 
the  fact  that  the  full  effect  of  this  plan  would  not  be  felt 
for  many  years — as  witness  the  prolonged  period  of  time 
involved  in  the  program  of  crop  substitution  that  Persia 
has  tentatively  offered  as  the  best  she  can  do  in  the  matter. 

8.  “Opium  as  an  International  Problem,”  Professor  W.  W.  Willoughby, 
Johns  Hopkins  Press,  1925.  Footnote  to  page  460.  See  also  Records,  Second 
Conference,  Vol.  II,  p.  174. 


7 


III.  The  C0A4PR0MISE  Plan  now  in  Operation 

Sufficient  reasons  have  been  given  to  show  why  the 
adoption  of  the  above  plan  is  not  now  and  has  not  in  the 
past  been  possible.  For  many,  though  not  all,  of  these 
reasons  and  for  a great  many  other  complex  reasons  in- 
volving politics,  economics,  national  prejudices  and  com- 
mercial greed,  the  Geneva  Conferences  of  1924-25  were 
obliged  to  turn  their  attention  in  other  directions  in  their 
efforts  to  make  progress  on  this  world  problem. 

Before  proceeding  to  what  would  appear  to  be  the 
most  practical  solution  of  the  problem,  let  us  see  what 
steps  actually  were  taken  at  Geneva.  The  Second  and 
principal  Convention  provides  for  a Central  Board  whose 
duty,  among  others,  it  would  be  to  administer  effectively 
certain  measures  which  the  Advisory  Committee  on 
Opium  had  (since  its  establishment  in  1920)  been  formu- 
lating and  more  or  less  carrying  out  through  the  medium 
of  the  Secretariat  of  the  League  of  Nations.  The  Com- 
mittee had  made  considerable  progress  (particularly  to- 
wards the  clarification  of  the  problem  to  be  solved  and 
by  shedding  much  light  on  the  illicit  traffic)  as  a result 
of  these  measures,  which  in  the  main  were: 

(a)  The  collection  of  statistics  as  to  the  world’s  cul- 
tivation, production  and  manufacture  of  opium  and  other 
dangerous  drugs.®’  Obviously  of  fundamental  impor- 
tance in  the  comprehensive  study  of  the  world  situation 
and  in  the  formulation  of  a policy  are  “What  quantities 
are  being  produced  and  manufactured?”  and  “What 
quantities  are  actually  required?” 

(b)  A determination  of  the  amounts  of  raw  ma- 
terials and  manufactured  drugs  required  for  medical  and 
scientific  purposes  in  the  different  countries.®’  “ 


9.  Recommendations  2,  3,  and  4.  Report  of  First  Session,  Advisory  Com- 
mittee on  Opium. 

10.  Chapter  VI,  Art.  22,  Convention  of  Second  Conference. 

11.  Ibid,  Art.  21. 


8 


(c)  The  collection  of  detailed  information  as  to  the 
movements  of  opium,  coca  leaves  and  manufactured  drugs 
between  all  countries.®'  It  was  well  known  that  some 
countries  received  drugs  greatly  in  excess  of  their  needs, 
and,  furthermore,  that  this  oversupply  was  eventually 
reaching  other  countries— -even  those  having  the  strictest 
import  laws — by  being  smuggled  in. 

The  collection  and  publication  of  this  information  is 
of  the  utmost  importance,  as  the  following  facts  chosen 
from  among  many  contained  in  a League  document^^ 
strikingly  illustrate. 

During  the  year  ending  May  10,  1925,  there  were 
shipped  from  Bushire,  Persia,  4,489  cases,  or  approxi- 
mately 346  tons,  of  Persian  opium — the  declared  destina- 
tion being  Vladivostock.  It  is  definitely  known  that 
3,558  cases,  or  approximately  273  tons,  never  reached 
Vladivostock.  At  the  very  highest  estimate,  the  total  con- 
ceivable medical  and  scientific  needs  of  the  world  are 
786  tons  of  raw  opium  per  year.^®  In  these  particular 
shipments  alone  at  least  one  third  of  a year’s  requirements 
conveniently  lost  their  way! 

(d)  The  collection  and  dissemination  of  information 
regarding  seizures  of  illicit  shipments.^®  It  was  realized 
that  information  regarding  such  seizures  would  be  of 
value,  especially  to  the  countries  directly  or  indirectly 
concerned. 

(e)  The  perfection  and  effective  execution  of  the 
system  of  import  certificates  and  export  authorizations^^ 
originally  conceived  and  to  a small  extent  made  effective 
by  the  Hague  Convention  of  1912.^®  The  complete 
adoption  of  this  system  would  insure  that  narcotic  sub- 
stances could  be  exported  from  any  country  only  after 

12.  Report,  Seventh  Session,  Advisory  Committee  on  Opium,  Annex  4. 

13.  Gavit,  op.  cit.,  pp.  36-37. 

14.  Unlike  the  preceding  measures,  this  is  not  a function  of  the  Central 

Board. 

15.  Art.  13,  Hague  Convention  and  Chap.  V,  Convention  of  Second 
Geneva  Conference. 


9 


the  production  (to  the  authorities)  by  the  exporter  of  a 
license  from  the  government  of  the  importing  country 
approving  the  importation.  The  wisdom  of  this  system 
and  the  practical  benefits  to  be  derived  from  it  have  been 
quickly  realized  by  certain  countries,^®  who,  although 
not  yet  adhering  to  the  Second  Geneva  Convention,  have 
nevertheless  accepted  and  put  into  force  this  system.  On 
the  other  hand,  some  countries  who  have  adhered  to  the 
Hague  Convention  of  fifteen  years  ago  have  not  yet  put 
the  system  into  force. 

(f)  The  policy,  whether  or  not  it  was  so  labelled, 
that  the  publication  of  the  cumulative  information  that 
is  being  gained  from  the  statistics  which,  from  year  to 
year,  are  coming  in  more  comprehensively  and  from  more 
countries,  would  eventually  so  enlighten  the  public  opin- 
ion of  the  world  that  more  concerted  and  better  directed 
efifort  would  be  made  to  eradicate  the  existing  evils.  M. 
Zahle,  President  of  the  Second  Conference,  in  his  final 
speech  strikingly  demonstrated  the  value  of  such  pub- 
licity, as  it  aflfects  one  of  the  phases  of  the  broad  problem, 
when  he  said : 

“Should  statistics  prove  that  any  nation’s  territory  is  being 
used  for  an  importation  grossly  in  excess  of  its  needs  and  ob- 
viously a danger  to  others,  the  Central  Board  can  recommend  the 
cessation  of  shipments  to  that  nation.  The  mere  threat  of  such 
action  and  the  mere  danger  of  an  aroused  world  opinion  should 
constitute  an  almost  irresistible  weapon  which  it  may  be  ex- 
pected will  never  have  to  be  used.” 

It  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  publicity  is  the 
one  thing  that  the  illicit  trade  and  all  the  other  under- 
ground forces  most  dread. 

IV.  Weaknesses  of  this  Plan 

The  above  measures,  which  in  the  main  constitute 
present  international  effort,  are  certainly  good  as  far  as 
they  go,  but  it  was  well  recognized  at  Geneva  that  they 

16.  Including  the  United  States.  In  February,  1927,  Turkey,  Persia 
and  China  were  notable  exceptions. 


10 


represent  only  a compromise  and  are  to  a large  extent 
merely  stepping  stones  to  a more  effective  policy.  They 
do  not  go  sufficiently  to  the  roots  of  the  matter,  nor  are 
they  as  fundamental  or  comprehensive  as  those  in  the  dis- 
carded plan  to  “pull  up  the  poppies.” 

Unfortunately,  these  measures  still  lack  the  “teeth” 
necessary  to  make  them  really  effective.  Ratification  of 
the  Second  Convention  is  necessary,  but  the  signatory 
Powers  have  been  strikingly  dilatory  over  the  matter. 
However,  the  prospects  of  sufficient  ratifications  to  make 
the  Convention  operative  are  at  present  much  brighter 
than  at  any  time  since  it  was  framed. 

An  additional  weakness  in  the  present  plan  is  that  the 
value  of  the  statistics  being  collected  is  considerably  les- 
sened owing  to  the  existing  delays  in  their  receipt  and 
subsequent  publication.  Many  countries  are  dilatory  in 
this  respect  (some  without  doubt  purposely  so),  distances 
are  great  and  the  required  channels  of  communication 
slow.  As  to  the  Annual  Reports,^®  similar  delays  are 
greatly  affecting  their  usefulness.  Persia,  for  example,  a 
key  country,  has  submitted  no  such  report  since  1922. 

V.  A Proposed  Solution 

Since  Eastern  countries,  including  large  producing 
and  consuming  countries  like  India  and  China,  cannot 
be  denied  their  right  to  consume  opium  however  they 
choose  within  their  own  borders,  it  follows  that  the  prob- 
lem narrows  itself  to  consideration  of  the  remaining 
surplus  and  the  drugs  manufactured  from  that  large  sur- 


17.  The  signatories  who,  up  to  March,  1927,  had  ratified  are  Great 
Britain,  India,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  the  Union  of  South  Africa,  the  Sudan, 
Portugal,  Salvador  and  Bolivia.  This  is  especially  significant  because  the 
Convention  contains  the  difficult  provision  that  it  will  only  become  operative 
when  ratified  by  ten  signatories,  of  which  two  must  be  permanent  members  of 
the  Council  of  the  League  and  five  others  non-permanent  Council  members. 
(See  Arts.  19  and  36).  The  only  Council  members  who  had  ratified  at  that 
date  were  Great  Britain  and  Salvador — permanent  and  non-permanent  members 
respectively. 

18.  Contemplated  by  both  the  Hague  and  the  Second  Geneva  Conven- 
tions, and  to  contain  comprehensive  and  detailed  information  regarding  the 
cultivation,  production,  manufacture  and  movements  cf  narcotic  substances. 

11 


plus.  Therefore,  the  League’s  invitation  to  the  Second 
Conference^®  indicated  that  its  purposes  were  to  conclude 
agreements : 

(1)  To  limit  the  production  of  raw  opium  and  coca  leaves  for 
export  to  the  amounts  required  for  medical  and  scientific 
purposes.^® 

(2)  To  limit  the  amounts  of  drugs  “to  be  manufactured”;^^ 
and,  somewhat  as  a corollary  thereto,  to  limit  the  amounts 
of  raw  materials  that  might  be  imported  for  such  manu- 
facture “and  for  other  medical  and  scientific  purposes.” 

The  fate  of  the  deliberations  over  (1) — limitation  of 
production — has  been  seen.  What  became  of  (2) — limi- 
tation of  the  drugs  to  be  manufactured?  First,  however, 
what  are  its  advantages  and  possibilities  of  accomplish- 
ment? 

The  world’s  medical  and  scientific  requirements  of 
morphine,  heroin,  cocaine  and  their  derivatives  are  now 
known  with  reasonable  accuracy.  Therefore,  if  the  man- 
ufacture of  these  drugs  could  be  entirely  and  absolutely 
under  international  and  governmental  control  and  limited 
to  the  world’s  requirements,  a far  more  fundamental  and 
comprehensive  solution  would  be  reached  than  by  the 
measures  now  in  operation,  and  one  that  would  certainly 
appear  to  be  more  possible  of  achievement  than  limiting 
the  production  of  raw  materials.  Effectually  limit  the 
amount  of  drugs  manufactured  to  the  legitimate  require- 
ments and  there  will  not — cannot — be  any  surplus  for  the 
illicit  trade. 

This  plan  has  the  very  great  advantage  that  it  might 
be  put  into  operation  without  awaiting  the  cumulative 
effect  of  the  reduction  of  the  world’s  opium  supply  over 
a long  period  of  years. 


19.  Resolution  VI.  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations,  September  27, 

1923. 

20.  This  was  to  give  effect  to  the  generally  accepted  American  prin- 
ciples stated  early  in  this  article,  although  the  latter  mentioned  “the  control” 
rather  than  “the  limitation”  of  production. 

21.  This  policy  had  been  previously  adopted  by  the  League  on  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  Advisory  Committee. 


12 


Another  advantage  of  this  plan  is  that  if  synthetic 
substitutes  should  be  discovered,  either  while  the  plan 
was  being  worked  out  or  after  it  had  been  put  in  opera- 
tion, the  progress  made  would  not  be  negatived,  as  we 
have  seen  would  tend  to  be  the  case  if  the  discovery  came 
while  the  plan  of  limiting  the  production  of  opium  was 
under  way.  Obviously,  the  establishments  turning  out 
these  synthetic  products  would  be  subjected  to  the  same 
complete  and  absolute  governmental  control  as  the  exist- 
ing factories.  The  disposition  of  the  raw  materials  now 
used  in  the  manufacture  of  drugs  would  not  present  an 
insurmountable  problem,  for  under  this  plan  there  would 
be  no  factories  available  in  which  to  manufacture  them 
into  drugs  destined  for  the  illicit  trade. 

It  will  at  once  be  asked:  “Would  not  ‘moonshining’ 
be  quickly  resorted  to  as  an  outlet  for  the  surplus  raw 
material?”  It  is  most  fortunate  that  the  world’s  40  or  50 
factories,  or  more  accurately  pharmaceutical  laboratories, 
are  and  must  needs  be  large,  expensively  equipped  and 
under  very  scientific  supervision.  Therefore,  moonshin- 
ing  plants,  because  much  too  large  to  be  hidden  in  cel- 
lars, would  not  long  escape  detection,  and  the  risk  of 
confiscation  of  the  costly  equipment  would  perhaps  be  an 
added  deterent.  These  facts  largely  preclude  the  possi- 
bility of  moonshining  to  any  dangerous  extent,  especially 
in  non-producing  countries  where  an  illicit  supply  of  the 
bulky  raw  material  would  be  necessary. 

The  institution  of  this  plan  to  limit  the  manufacture 
of  drugs  would  neither  supplant  nor  interfere  with  the 
procedure  now  in  operation;  nor,  in  fact,  would  it  lessen 
the  need  for  such  results  as  are  being  obtained  under  it. 

In  October,  1926,  the  United  States  Government  ad- 
dressed a Note  to  all  countries  adhering  to  the  Hague 
Convention  which  shows  the  importance  this  Govern- 
ment at  last  is  attaching  to  the  control  of  manufacture. 
It  is  most  significant  that  the  Note  omitted  all  reference 
to  the  problems  of  poppy  growth  and  opium  smoking 

13 


and  confined  itself  to  requesting  the  other  Hague  Con- 
vention countries  to  limit  the  manufacture  of  drugs  as 
conscientiously  and  efficiently  as  we  do — to  the  end  that 
there  will  be  no  surplus  for  the  illicit  trade. 

VI.  Drawbacks  to  this  Solution 

A major  obstacle  in  the  way  of  this  plan’s  achievement 
is  the  effect  that  it  would  have  on  many  of  the  continental 
commercial  interests  engaged  in  the  manufacture  of 
drugs. 

As  we  have  seen,  consideration  of  the  possibilities  of 
limiting  the  manufacture  of  drugs  was  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal purposes  for  which  the  Second  Geneva  Conference 
was  called,  though  it  should  be  noted  that  the  invitation 
only  referred  to  “limitation  of  the  amount  of  morphine, 
heroin  or  cocaine  and  their  respective  salts  to  be  manu- 
factured” and  not  to  a limitation  of  such  amounts  to  the 
world’s  medical  and  scientific  needs.  Clearly,  if  the 
world’s  annual  requirements  of  morphine,  are,  for  ex- 
ample, say,  27,000  lbs.,  little  if  anything  is  gained  by 
“limiting  the  amount  to  be  manufactured  to  75,000  lbs.  or 
even  50,000  lbs.  Therefore,  the  real  desire  was  undoubt- 
edly to  limit  output,  not  to  certain  purposes  but  to  the 
amounts  required  for  those  purposes;  the  Sub-Committee 
appointed  to  deal  with  this  phase  of  the  matter  clearly 
recognized  that  such  were  the  hopes  that  were  enter- 
tained.^^ It  is  all  the  more  remarkable  that  nothing  was 
done  about  it;  that  is,  not  a thing  was  done  to  limit  the 
output  to  the  requirements.^^  Article  V of  the  Convention 


22.  “The  Sub-Committee  recognizes  that  the  scheme  which  it  now  sub- 
mits for  the  approval  of  the  Conference  may  not  fulfill  as  completely  as  could 
be  wished  the  hopes  which  were  entertained  in  many  quarters  that  an  effective 
scheme  would  be  worked  out  by  the  Conference  for  limiting  the  amounts  of 
the  drugs  manufactured  to  the  quantities  actually  required  for  the  world’s 
medical  and  scientific  needs.”  Records,  Second  Conference,  Vol.  I,  page  473. 

23.  No  drug  manufacturing  country  except  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  agreed  to  the  plan  proposed  by  the  Advisory  Committee,  namely: 
that  each  country  should  announce  at  the  beginning  of  each  year  its  annual 
requirements  for  medicine  and  science,  and  that  it  should  abide  by  this  figure 
unless  extraordinary  circumstances  demanded  a change. 

14 


does  provide  that  the  Contracting  Parties  shall  enact 
laws  to  limit  manufacture  exclusively  to  medical  and  sci- 
entific purposes,  but  it  makes  no  provision  for  limitation 
of  the  total  amount  to  be  manufactured. 

Authorities  largely  concur  in  the  opinion  that  com- 
mercial greed  is  at  the  bottom  of  it — underneath  “na- 
tional” interests — and  that  the  pressure  which  continental 
manufacturers  were  able  to  exert  at  Geneva  had  much 
to  do  with  the  fate  of  this  plan. 

The  fact  is  illuminating  that  a certain  continental 
country  acknowledged  the  manufacture  of  an  average  of 
1.4  tons  of  cocaine  in  two  recent  consecutive  years.  Al- 
though that  country’s  medical  requirements  of  cocaine, 
based  on  the  Advisory  Committee  estimates,  are  only 
28-lOOOths  of  one  ton,  no  export  of  cocaine  was  reported! 
What  became  of  the  surplus 

These  drugs  cannot  be  left  to  ordinary  commercial 
competition  wherein  the  manufacturers  of  any  one  coun- 
try would  be  practically  free  to  compete  for  the  entire 
market  should  their  government  be  slack  in  international 
cooperation.  It  is  essential  that  the  drugs  be  entirely  and 
absolutely  under  governmental  control. 

The  other  immediate  difficulty,  a very  great  one  and 
one  that  has  been  made  full  use  of  by  the  commercial 
interests,  is  the  problem  of  how  the  world’s  legitimate 
market  would  be  divided  up  among  the  manufacturing 
countries;  that  is,  how  would  their  export  trade  be  ap- 
portioned? 

How  knotty  a problem  this  is  may  perhaps  be  best  in- 
dicated by  stating  the  objections  that  are  raised  to  some 
of  the  solutions  that  have  been  suggested. 

If  the  apportioning  were  based  on  present  output, 
those  manufacturers  throughout  the  world  whose  business 
has  been  bona  fide  would  be  up  in  arms  because  the  lion’s 

24.  Gavit,  op.  cit.,  pages  45-46. 


15 


share  of  the  trade  would  go  to  those  other  manufacturers 
whose  illegitimate  trade  (camouflaged  but  supplemented 
by  their  legitimate  trade)  had  been  greatest. 

The  suggestion  that  each  country  manufacture  its  own 
requirements  and  no  more,  would  seem  impossible  for 
obvious  financial  reasons,  and  dangerous  because  of  the 
increased  possibilities  of  leakage  from  factories  in  small 
countries  where  government  control  would  be  weak. 

A pool  of  all  the  manufacturers  has  been  suggested 
as  still  another  method  of  arriving  at  an  equable  appor- 
tionment. Since  the  objection  to  such  a pool  is  also  and 
quite  independently  a drawback  to  what  we  have  consid- 
ered to  be  the  most  practical  solution  of  the  major  prob- 
lem, it  is  mentioned  separately.  In  a pool,  the  manu- 
facturers would  rightly  object  that  neither  they,  their 
respective  governments  nor  the  League  of  Nations  would 
be  in  a position  to  ensure  that  no  drugs  would  be  manu- 
factured (to  supply  the  illicit  trade)  in  some  country, 
like  Russia,  which  had  neither  adhered  to  the  plan  nor 
was  a League  member,  and  that  it  would  be  next  to  im- 
possible to  prevent  drugs  so  manufactured  from  finding 
their  way  to  the  Western  world.  Pool  or  no  pool,  there 
appears  to  be  no  force,  save  public  opinion,  that  could 
prevent  an  “outside”  country  from  manufacturing  for  the 
illicit  trade.  Persia’s  intimation  at  the  Second  Confer- 
ence that  under  certain  conditions^"  she  might  be  obliged 
to  set  up  a factory  within  her  own  territory  is  in  some  re- 
spects a case  in  point;  China  is  not  in  a position  to  enforce 
any  agreement  she  might  honestly  wish  to  undertake  re- 
garding manufacture,  and  the  position  of  some  areas  like 
the  Native  States  of  India  is  obscure.^® 


25.  “When  the  suggested  restrictions  on  opium  shipments  in  British 
bottoms  first  became  known,  tentative  proposals  were  submitted  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  a factory  for  the  conversion  of  opium  into  morphine  and  other 
opium  derivatives.”  Persian  Memorandum,  Records,  Second  Conference,  Vol. 
li,  page  196. 

26.  In  this  connection  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  although  up  to 
the  present  the  opium  of  China  and  India,  whether  British  India  or  the  Native 
States,  has  been  very  little  used  for  the  manufacture  of  drugs  owing  to  its  low 
morphia  content,  it  is  nevertheless  entirely  possible  to  so  use  it;  in  fact,  in 

16 


The  recent  American  Note  to  Hague  Convention  ad- 
herents, previously  mentioned,  may  prove  to  be  produc- 
tive of  much  good,  but  even  should  our  fellow  adherents 
turn  over  a new  leaf  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  the  estab- 
lishment of  factories  in  “outside”  countries. 

These  drawbacks  can  by  no  means  be  ignored,  but  at 
the  same  time  they  appear  far  less  formidable  than  those 
presented  by  the  other  plans.  The  utmost  possible  in- 
ternational cooperation,  increased  collection  and  dissem- 
ination of  statistics  and  information,  and  a resultingly 
greater  world  sentiment  will  be  the  strongest  weapons  in 
overcoming  these  drawbacks.  Very  especially,  too,  must 
the  drug  manufacturers  themselves  be  brought  by  pres- 
sure of  both  public  opinion  and  governmental  action  to 
solve  the  commercial  problems  that  the  export  market 
presents.  They  can  no  longer  be  allowed  to  evade  the 
issue. 

VII.  Conclusion 

So  we  have  three  plans;  that  of  pulling  up  the  surplus 
poppies — which  is  definitely  impossible  for  some  years  to 
come;  that  of  clarifying  the  problem  to  be  solved  and  tak- 
ing measures  directed  against  the  illicit  traffic — the  plan 
of  limited  scope  now  in  operation;  that  of  limiting  the 
world  output  of  manufactured  drugs — an  effective  plan, 
not  without  large  difficulties,  but  nevertheless  one  that 
would  appear  possible  of  achievement,  and  with  a mini- 
mum of  delay. 

The  Geneva  Conferences  had  the  invaluable  effect  of 
bringing  this  vast  narcotic  problem  into  the  limelight,  but 
it  must  be  kept  there  and  it  is  only  by  a constantly  in- 
creasing volume  of  public  opinion,  awakening  the 


1924  about  two  tons  of  crude  morphine  were  shipped  from  the  Indian  Govern- 
ment factory  to  the  High  Commissioner  for  India,  London,  “for  disposal  for 
strictly  and  bona  fide  medical  purposes.”  (League  document  O.  C.  415,  page 
5.)  It  may  be  mentioned  that  early  in  1926  British  India  made  the  very  im- 
portant and  quite  voluntary  decision  to  abolish  the  export  of  opium  for  smoking 
and  eating  purposes  cumulatively  and  totally  by  1936. 

17 


world  to  the  dangers  of  the  situation  and  creating  en- 
lightened and  intelligent  interest,  that  the  problem  can  be 
eventually  solved. 


NOTE.  Since  this  article  was  written  there  have  been  two 
important  developments.  The  Advisory  Committee,  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1927 , passed  a resolution  asking  that  thorough  in- 
quiries be  made  by  the  governments  of  all  countries  in 
zvhich  drugs  are  manufactured,  with  a view  to  discovering 
FROM  WHOM  and  by  what  method  the  illicit  traffickers 
procure  their  supplies.  However,  resolutions  of  the  Com- 
mittee are  merely  recommendations,  on  which  the  various 
governments  are  under  no  obligation  to  act.  It  is,  there- 
fore, very  doubtful  whether  any  direct  good  will  result  im- 
mediately, as  certain  countries  will  naturally  be  very  loath 
to  lay  bare  a self -incriminating  situation.  On  the  other 
hand,  their  failure  to  report  at  all  would  be  perhaps  equally 
damning  in  the  eyes  of  the  world — if  aroused. 

The  other  important  development  is  that  by  May  1st 
Czechoslovakia  had  ratified  the  Second  Convention  and 
had  deposited  her  ratification  at  Geneva;  France  and  Poland 
had  also  ratified  but  their  ratifications  still  lacked  the  neces- 
sary deposit  with  the  League.  These  three  countries  are 
all  Council  members,  and  since  it  is  reasonable  to  assume 
that  the  ratifications  of  France  and  Poland  will  in  due 
course  become  effective,  they  make,  with  Great  Britain  who 
deposited  her  ratification  over  a year  ago,  and  Salvador  last 
winter,  five  of  the  necessary  seven  ratifications  by  Council 
members,  consequently  making  it  very  probable  that  the  Coru- 
vention  will  after  all  eventually  come  into  operation.  Of 
the  remaining  nine  Council  members,  Roumania  appears 
to  be  nearest  to  the  point  of  ratifying;  the  Convention  has 
been  approved  by  both  Chambers  of  the  Netherlands,  its 
ratification  by  that  country  only  awaiting  certain  necessary 
amendments  to  internal  laws,  and  there  are  at  least  some 
prospects  that  Japan  and  Italy  zvill  ratify. 


18 


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